Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 2 Symposium on Philosophical
Hermeneutics and Critical Legal Theory

Article 2

December 2000

Foreword
Francis J. Mootz III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Francis J. Mootz III, Foreword, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 719 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol76/iss2/2

This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

FOREWORD
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III*
This Symposium brings the considerable talents of a diverse
group of scholars to bear on a pressing problem in legal theory:
Whether critical theory is possible after the hermeneutical turn. All
too often, this problem is framed to invite an "either-or" response.
Either we reject the hermeneutical turn and hew to a traditional
account of critique anchored by an unimpeachable standard (whether
economic, historical, conceptual, cognitive, or otherwise), or we take
the hermeneutical turn by embracing radical historical contingency
and fluidity, thereby forsaking the possibility of critique and
surrendering to conservative conventionalism or inviting postmodern
chaos. This Symposium challenges this either-or formulation more
than it proposes a definitive answer to the problem.
In this Foreword, I describe in very general terms the historical
and political contexts for raising the question of critique in light of the
hermeneutical turn, and then I briefly describe how each article
contributes to our understanding of this question. It is commonplace
at this juncture of a foreword to disavow the pretense of being able to
capture the depth and nuance of the contributions that follow, and I
must emphatically follow this convention. Each article discusses a
shared topic from a different perspective and with a different focus.
It is fair to say that the articles comprise a wide-ranging conversation
more than an organized elaboration of a set of theses. My purpose is
to provide a (contested) point of entry to this conversation about the
potential for critical theory after the hermeneutical turn, rather than
to foretell an answer to the question.

* I would like to thank the Chicago-Kent Law Review for agreeing to publish this
Symposium; Paul J. Ferak, Eric R. Moran, and the editorial staff for their organization and
professionalism; and Professor Steven J. Heyman for his encouragement and support. I would
also like to thank Caren Senter and George Taylor for carefully reading and commenting on
earlier drafts of this Foreword.
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GADAMER AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

The term "philosophical hermeneutics" is most often associated
with the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Gadamer is widely
acknowledged to be one of the contemporary architects of the
hermeneutical turn in philosophy, a movement that has had a lasting
impact in a variety of fields including law, literature, linguistics, and
sociology. Gadamer is one of the most important philosophers of this
century because those who follow after him, whether expressly or not,
must wrestle with the questions that he struggled to articulate. To
take one particularly vivid example of Gadamer's influence, Jirgen
Habermas's renowned efforts to reconstruct philosophy, sociology,
and political theory have been shaped in substantial ways by his
reaction to Gadamer's philosophical insights. Gadamer is also a
touchstone for contemporary theorists because he works from a
strong grounding in, and re-reading of, the philosophical tradition.
The contributors to this Symposium not only take up Gadamer's
philosophical legacy as it is manifest in a number of different currents
in contemporary efforts to develop critical legal theory, they also
reach back to the classical roots of Gadamer's philosophy.
The topic of this Symposium is particularly timely since February
2000 marked the centenary of Gadamer's birth. However, with a
body of work that spans from classical translations and explications of
Plato's philosophy to an analysis of the transformations ushered in by
the computer age, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics will
continue to be a substantial point of reference in philosophical
discourse for many years beyond the centenary celebration. Despite
their differences, the contributors are in agreement that the issues
raised by philosophical hermeneutics require and deserve additional
thinking in the coming years.
Gadamer's principal philosophical claim is that the experience of
truth is not exhausted by the methodological approach of modern
technical-empirical science. In Truth and Method he criticizes the
belief that insulated and self-determining subjects cast interpretations
(whether scientific, aesthetic, or political) over the determinate
objects comprising the world. He argues that interpretation is not just
a method for bringing objects into a sharper focus, but rather that
human experience is fundamentally interpretive. Gadamer's most
vivid model of the hermeneutical nature of understanding is the giveand-take experience of everyday conversation. A genuine conversation does not involve the production of knowledge by following a
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methodological strategy. Instead, a conversation happens only within
a historical context and between two individuals who are motivated
by preunderstandings, or "prejudices."
To be a discussant without prejudices would be to exist outside
of history and time. Prejudices are the marks of human finitude. On
one hand, without historically conditioned prejudices, there would be
no shared basis (a developing tradition) from which to engage
another person. On the other hand, without any prejudices there
would be no difference between two discussants, and without
difference there simply would be nothing to talk about. Gadamer
insists that prejudices are not rigid limitations, but rather constitute a
horizon that continually is in flux as the person accumulates
experience. We experience conversation as an event that happens to
us, inasmuch as it takes its own path when we converse with another
person because neither is directing the conversation with complete
control. So too, all human understanding involves a fusion of
horizons in which a common subject is taken up by two participants in
a manner that allows the subject matter to unfold through their
dialogue in a way that feels "natural" rather than as a product of
methodological rules designed to produce knowledge. Difference
always remains when the conversation concludes, sometimes painfully
so, but conversation effects a kind of shared experience that can serve
as the basis for future dialogue.
Gadamer argues that legal interpretation provides a particularly
vivid demonstration of his hermeneutical philosophy. Because judges
are faced with specific cases that require a binding judgment, there is
much less of a threat that practitioners will become overly enamored
with methodologies that purport to extract the "true" meaning of
authoritative legal texts. Most practicing lawyers quickly discover
that it is difficult enough to find a fitting and persuasive interpretation
that supports their client's position, leading them to regard the quest
for a univocal, true interpretation as an academic pursuit of no real
moment. Gadamer stresses that understanding is always a historical
project of rearticulating the tradition in response to the practical
demands of the present. This means that within legal practice we can
understand a binding norm only within a practical context:
understanding and application are a unified act. At a crucial juncture
of Truth and Method, Gadamer offers legal practice as an exemplary
instance of his thesis that rule-knowledge cannot be separated from
rule-application. Because Gadamer acknowledges that legal practice
provides indispensable guidance for hermeneutical philosophy, it is
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not necessary to import his philosophy to legal practice as if it is a
strange and novel provocation from a "foreign discipline."
PROBLEM: IS CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY POSSIBLE AFTER THE
HERMENEUTICAL TURN?

If Gadamer is correct, then it would appear that the aspirations
of critical legal theorists to deconstruct legal practice with a strong
theoretical construct is highly suspect. Critics regularly charge that
Gadamer invites conservatism and quietism by insisting on the
"prejudiced" and contextual nature of understanding as part of his
vigorous challenge to the most ambitious claims of the
Enlightenment. Gadamer is adamant that the "risk" to subjectivity
that is entailed by a "fusion of horizons" always opens our prejudices
to revision, but most critics argue that Gadamer invites only
individual critical engagements with others as educative and
enlightening, and that he rejects the possibility of developing a more
systemic critical theory. In the 1960s, Gadamer engaged in an
extended debate with Jirgen Habermas about the possibility of
critical theory. Habermas resolutely defended the epistemological
legitimacy of critically assessing social structures and beliefs according
to Freud's model of overcoming "systematically distorted
communication."
In response, Gadamer rejected Habermas's
attempt to "psychoanalyze" society from a privileged perch as just
another fruitless quest inspired by the Enlightenment desire to
eliminate prejudice with the power of reason. Several thinkers, most
notably Paul Ricoeur, attempted to chart a middle course. Ricoeur
suggested that the dialectic between the hermeneutics of belonging
(advanced by Gadamer) and the hermeneutics of suspicion (advanced
by Habermas) cannot be dissolved, and he championed the cause of a
critical hermeneutics that is animated by this dialectic.
Thirty years later, the Gadamer-Habermas debate continues to
reverberate in the clash between postmodern legal scholars and the
ever-expanding array of critical legal scholars, including feminists,
critical race theorists, and gaylegal theorists. With the recent
publication of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas has joined in this
contemporary dispute with a complex argument in defense of critical
legal theory. However, Habermas claims that theory justifies only a
thin, or procedural, account of law, implicitly recognizing the force of
Gadamer's earlier arguments. The contributors to this Symposium
enter this contested debate by addressing whether critical legal theory
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can survive the hermeneutic turn initiated by Gadamer. From
different disciplines and perspectives, each contributor in effect poses
the question: Do Gadamer's ontological and epistemological
arguments about the interpretive character of human existence
inevitably lead to conservative quiescence or postmodern paralysis, or
is critical legal theory still possible (albeit without the self-assurance
guiding early proponents of critical legal studies) if we accept (in
whole or in part) Gadamer's philosophical arguments?
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS

The first three articles provide important historical perspectives
that situate the problematic of contemporary hermeneutics. P. Christopher Smith contends that Gadamer's recourse to Aristotle's
philosophy provides an antidote to Plato's theory of argumentation as
a clash in which a person attempts to compel the adherence of
another by demonstrating the inescapable truth that he or she already
possesses. Aristotle's attention to deliberation and taking counsel
with another revives the Homeric tradition of reason as participation
in a preexisting social realm, rather than reducing dialogue to the
announcement of an individually discerned truth. Smith endorses
Gadamer's description of legal practice as a model of social reason,
and he argues that we should overcome the adversarial and
demonstrative model by recapturing a communal understanding that
rests on social bonds. This normative claim evidences Smith's belief
that the risk of taking counsel with another, rather than subjecting
another to one's proofs and demonstrations, works as a critical check
on individual hubris in a manner that can reinvigorate legal practice.
Peter Goodrich provides a different historical account of
hermeneutics. Rather than tracing and recuperating the roots of
Gadamer's philosophy, Goodrich finds historical traces within legal
practice that evidence its diversity and contingency.
Goodrich
reconstructs an "amatory jurisprudence" based on the fifteenthcentury "courts of love" that challenges our notions of law and
judgment that have been shaped by the aggrandizing force of unitary
and centralized state jurisdictions. Amatory jurisprudence reveals an
effort to adjudicate the private realm of love, thereby challenging the
sober and dramatically restricted scope of legal rule in modern time.
In an interesting connection with Smith's article, Goodrich suggests
that amatory jurisprudence was a dialogic expression of care and
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community that often was favored over the legalistic rituals of the
day, providing for more nuanced judgments that did not brand one
party a winner and the other a loser.
Finally, Charles W. Collier provides a historical account of a
variety of "professional narratives," or hermeneutical paradigms, in
order to better understand the socially constructed professional
narratives of law and legal practice. Collier surveys the common law
narrative, the constitutional narrative, and the community-society
narrative as constitutive narratives in legal practice. He begins with
an important insight: Socially constructed narratives are no less real
to participants in a practice than would be the mythical timeless
narratives of justice and law that animate traditional accounts.
Collier exposes the hermeneutic constitution of legal practice in
reviewing these narratives, in a move similar to Goodrich uncovering
forgotten aspects of our jurisprudential tradition. Collier's purpose is
to draw our attention to the need for a hermeneutic professional
narrative and the shifting dimensions of these plural narratives, thus
challenging the idea that there is or can be a unitary "correct"
professional narrative that generates specific answers to legal
disputes.
II. HERMENEUTICS AND CRITIQUE: DIALOGUE OR DISJUNCTION?

The second group of articles explicitly addresses the apparent
conflict between hermeneutics and critique by assessing Gadamer's
position in comparison to a number of contemporary theorists. Fred
Dallmayr revisits the Gadamer-Habermas debate in an innovative
way, utilizing the metaphor of a "border" to critically assess each
philosopher's continuing response to their famous exchanges.
Whereas Habermas has continued to demarcate realms of reason and
to propose metatheoretical approaches that draw sharp boundaries,
Gadamer has continued to view borders as permeable horizons that
can be "crossed" in hermeneutical exchanges. Dallmayr argues that
these divergent approaches to "borders" have significantly different
effects on our effort to deal with the ongoing process of globalization,
with Gadamer offering a plausible pathway to a genuine "dialogue of
civilizations" that is not beholden to Eurocentric traditions.
Ingrid Scheibler continues this line of thinking by arguing that an
emerging "left-Gadamerian" approach opens the possibility for
critique. Gadamer endorses Heidegger's emphasis on language, but
he does not abandon the social use of language in everyday discourse
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as part of Heidegger's radical effort to overcome tradition through
destruktion. Gadamer similarly endorses Habermas's concern with
reinvigorating a public sphere that is not warped by unproductive
prejudices, but he does not embrace Habermas's rationalist
In effect, Scheibler contends, Gadamer's model of
tendencies.
conversational understanding situates him between Heidegger and
Hermeneutics has a critical component because it
Habermas.
involves an active acknowledgment of the tradition within the context
of a practical demand to act morally and appropriately.
Stephen M. Feldman also positions Gadamer, but he places him
prior to Derrida's deconstruction and Habermas's critical theory.
Feldman accepts the ontological force of Gadamer's philosophical
critique of methodologism, but he insists that this does not preclude
all manner of methodology. Just as Gadamer accepts the role and
value of scientific methodology, notwithstanding its hermeneutical
basis, Feldman suggests that we can employ the philosophies of
Habermas and Derrida as alternative critical methodologies that
partially foreground some of the prejudices that define our
hermeneutical situation. Feldman disavows the project of building a
guiding meta-theory, but his mediation embraces the use of plural
methodologies to foster ongoing critical activity.
Gary Wickham explores the potential connections between
Foucault's "governmentality" approach, which has contributed to the
burgeoning field of sociolegal studies, and Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Despite some points of connection, Wickham concludes that
Gadamer's project does not easily mesh with the Foucaultian critique
that he has done much to articulate and advance. Wickham argues
that Foucault's reading of Heidegger diverges significantly from
Gadamer's, and that an attempt to link the philosophers through their
common heritage is unavailing. Whereas Gadamer places central
importance on dialogue as an activity, Foucaultian critics regard
conversational dialogue as an object to be investigated. In short,
Wickham suggests that the divide between hermeneutics and critical
theory (in a Foucaultian sense) cannot be bridged easily, although
there are a few vague family resemblances evident in the literature.
In the final article of this section, I review Jack Balkin's theory of
Balkin
ideology and critique from a Gadamerian perspective.
generally follows Gadamerian premises, but he finds it necessary to
deviate from philosophical hermeneutics in order to provide an
account of ideology critique. I argue that Balkin errs to the extent
that he distinguishes his approach from Gadamer, and I contend that
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Gadamer's philosophy, as interpreted and extended in the work of
P. Christopher Smith and Calvin Schrag, provides sufficient resources
for explaining the force of ideology and also the potential for critique.
I rely on two models of critique that I have developed in prior
articles: rhetorical exchange and psychotherapeutic practice.
III. HERMENEUTICS AND CRITIQUE IN LEGAL PRACTICE
The final section of the Symposium brings these theoretical
concerns to bear on particular areas of legal practice. R. George
Wright addresses the theoretical stalemate surrounding the
constitutionality of legal penalties for hate speech by drawing on the
complementary accounts of social conversation offered by Gadamer
and Habermas. Despite their important differences, Gadamer and
Habermas share a sophisticated approach to discourse that points the
way toward distinguishing speech that promotes the values underlying
First Amendment protection from speech that does not. Wright is
careful, however, to use the Gadamer-Habermas model only for
inspiration. He avoids glossing over their differences, and he refrains
from pretending that their philosophies can be applied to law as a
decisional template that provides answers in specific cases.
Allan C. Hutchinson, a long-standing advocate of critical legal
studies, promotes a reading of Gadamer's hermeneutics that coheres
with his critical project. Hutchinson characterizes the common law as
a "work-in-progress" that is deeply contingent and inevitably
political. Although he regards Gadamer's emphasis on tradition as
misplaced, Hutchinson finds a radical side to Gadamer that can be
used against his more conservative tendencies. Hutchinson provides
a concrete point of reference for his discussion with an analysis of
Justice Souter's opinion in the "right to die" cases before the
Supreme Court.
Hutchinson criticizes my earlier Gadamerian
reading of this same opinion for failing to follow the radical
implications of Gadamer's insights in an uncompromising manner,
and he argues that Gadamer can be rescued from what he believes is
an overly conservative reading only by holding firm to the insight that
"law is politics."
John T. Valauri set out to map the debates in hermeneutical
philosophy and social theory onto the contemporary debates in
constitutional theory, but he reluctantly concludes that there is no
easy and direct correspondence. Valauri believes that this undercuts
Gadamer's claim of hermeneutic universality to the extent that the
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legal context presents specific normative issues that the ontological
bent of philosophical hermeneutics does not address.
Valauri
favorably compares Gadamer's approach to that of Betti and
Habermas, but in the end he suggests that Gadamer's ontological
account must be supplemented with an ethical dimension if it is to
hold more direct relevance for ongoing disputes in constitutional
theory.
George H. Taylor moves in the opposite direction, arguing that
the apparent conflict between understanding (hermeneutics) and
explanation (critical theory) is misplaced, inasmuch as they comprise
a symbiotic dynamic that is manifest in legal theory and practice.
Reviewing the work of prominent theorists and judges, Taylor
demonstrates that each of their attempts to privilege either
understanding or explanation in fact reflects both motivations.
Although specific disciplines may be circumscribed enough to permit
rigorous explanation in the model of the logical-empirical sciences,
Taylor underscores the scope of his claim by comparing legal theory
to evolutionary biology, arguing that both disciplines involve an
intertwining of explanation and understanding.
COMMENTARY: RETHINKING THE HERMENEUTIC TuRNs IN LEGAL
THEORY

Robin West concludes the Symposium with a probing and
provocative commentary in which she poses a fundamental challenge
for hermeneutically minded critics. West begins by suggesting that
philosophical hermeneutics is not a curiosity that has been developed
by a few offbeat legal academics, but rather that it has become,
directly or indirectly, one of the guiding perspectives in legal theory.
Although West acknowledges the dilemma expressed by the topic of
this Symposium, she finds some comfort from the fact that it is critical
legal scholars who are turning to hermeneutical philosophy. She
raises a more radical concern, though: What do we lose when the
critical project is first filtered through hermeneutical presuppositions?
I wish to close this Foreword by previewing some of West's
interesting points and offering my own thoughts about this broader
question. West correctly notes that contemporary legal theory is
marked by a multiplicity of "hermeneutical turns," and she argues
that each turn demonstrates that when we turn toward something we
necessarily turn away from something else. I take her principal point
to be that the fascination with interpreting texts often obscures our
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pre-cognitive existence, which is defined by our mind-bodily
inherence in physical space and affective relationships. Have the
hermeneutic turns in legal theory turned us away from our
mammalian selves and pointed us too rigidly toward our linguistic
selves? Do we forget the fundamental reality of empathy and human
connectedness as a result of our fixation on the experience of
interpreting texts? I think that West is quite right to pose these
questions to legal theorists, but I would insist that the hermeneutical
turn (my use of the singular here is intended) best accommodates
It may well be that some of the
West's incisive criticisms.
hermeneutical turns in legal theory have been too narrow and
therefore unsatisfactory, but the corrective may come from
developing a better appreciation of the hermeneutical turn, in effect
freeing it from overly parochialized expressions in various
hermeneutical turns in legal theory.
Gadamer's assertion of the "universality of the hermeneutic
situation" is not a claim that life is nothing but interpreting texts, but
rather that reflective life and social projects are grounded on
understandings that are hermeneutically secured. Even accepting
West's critique of particular hermeneutical turns in legal theory, is it
not the case that we ultimately must ask how we can translate our
affective lives into, social practices and political institutions? It would
appear that dialogue, some form of rhetorical engagement with
others, is inevitable when we undertake this project. Even if we
reflect on such issues silently, we engage in a "dialogue with
ourselves" that is always parasitical on a lifetime of conversations
with others. Philosophical hermeneutics may very well be insufficiently attentive to our nonlinguistic lived reality. Nevertheless, it
provides the best account of how we are able to join together with
others and act on the basis of our lived reality. I agree that we must
read Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of our existence
along with Gadamer's hermeneutics, but I see no need to choose
between them. More strongly, I believe that there is a continuity in
their thinking and approaches that yields synergistic benefits.
An example given by West may clarify my point. West
persuasively argues that one of the hermeneutical turns in legal
theory has been to eliminate the nontextual, fundamental rights
approach of so-called "noninterpretivists," principally by regarding
legal texts as more malleable and capacious and therefore amenable
to "interpretation." But her argument that we should refer to
nontextual values does not undermine the hermeneutical insight,
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because it remains a hermeneutical task to articulate such values and
to persuade others to endorse them and to act on them. The problem
that West identifies follows from a rather narrow application of

philosophical hermeneutics by some legal theorists who are fixated on
developing new techniques for textual interpretation. In other words,
the problem lies with one of the hermeneutical turns in legal theory,
rather than with the philosophical orientation designated as the
hermeneutical turn.'
I can only applaud West's careful and detailed demonstration of
the inadequacies of the hermeneutical turns of legal theory, but I
would reserve the possibility that these inadequacies have resulted

from an overly superficial application of the hermeneutical turn. This
is not to say that the "hermeneutical turn" is a fixed position
requiring no further elaboration. If this Symposium demonstrates
nothing else, it demonstrates the folly of adopting such a view. West
issues a much needed challenge to all hermeneutical thinkers to relate

their studies back to the lived reality in which they work, thereby
constantly rethinking the hermeneutical turn. This is an important
reminder in two respects: we must pursue the ethical and social
implications of philosophical hermeneutics, but we must also recall
that the activity of philosophizing takes place within a certain social
and political context.2 And so, in closing, I unreservedly endorse
1. It is helpful to recall that Gadamer refers to the practice of judging as an example that
reinforces one of his three central topics: the historicity of understanding. Gadamer's first topic,
the experience of truth in art, addresses the kinds of issues that West properly raises against
those who would cabin Gadamer's philosophy as relating only to textual interpretation.
Gadamer does not regard the truth of art as a message that is interpreted, but instead as an
experience that follows from, and reveals, our interpretive nature. The shock of recognition
that often constitutes the truth of art is hermeneutic, but it is not (in the first instance)
exegetical.
2. Gadamer makes these same points about his philosophy:
[Philosophical hermeneutics] limits the position of the philosopher in the modem
world. However much he may be called to draw radical inferences from everything,
the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher, or of know-it-all does not suit him.
What man needs is not just the persistent posing of ultimate questions, but the
sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now. The
philosopher, of all people, must, I think, be aware of the tension between what he
claims to achieve and the reality in which he finds himself.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, at xxxviii (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960). Some might read this passage as foreclosing
radical critique, but I believe that it is equally plausible to read this passage as communicating
Gadamer's belief that radical criticism-criticism that gets to the root of the issue-is more
likely to follow from an acknowledgment by the critic that she is situated in a finite historical
reality rather than from the critic's pretense to deliver a critique from outside the situation that
she criticizes.
Gadamer's social commentary is not in the vein of critical theory, but nonetheless
represents sensitive and nuanced interpretations of the challenges of modern life. See, e.g.,
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West's prescription: "As we follow the path laid out by the
interpretive turns, we should from time to time glance over our
shoulder and appreciate those horizons we have left behind. We
might want to go back and reclaim them." 3 This, it seems to me, is

precisely the lesson of the hermeneutical turn, and it describes the
constant challenge confronting the hermeneutical turns in contemporary legal theory.

HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE ENIGMA OF HEALTH: THE ART OF HEALING IN A SCIENTIFIC
AGE (Jason Gaiger & Nicholas Walker trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1996) (1993); HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, PRAISE OF THEORY: SPEECHES AND ESSAYS (Chris Dawson trans., Yale Univ.
Press 1998) (1983). This approach is made plain in one of Gadamer's speeches, when he
observes:
Whatever philosophy is, it must be seen as a natural propensity within us all rather
than as some sort of professional skill or ability. I ask of you, then, that my
contribution today be understood not as that of a specialist who has answers to all the
questions, but rather as that of one who is simply putting forward his own reflections
alongside everyone else's.
GADAMER, THE ENIGMA OF HEALTH, supra, at 93. The question is whether we can appreciate
that the project of critical theory (perhaps paradoxically) resides in this openness to dialogic
engagement.
3. Robin L. West, Are There Nothing but Texts in This Class? Interpretingthe Interpretive
Turns in Legal Thought 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1125, 1130 (2000).

